We contribute to the debate on how to assess the size of the underground or shadow economy with a reinterpretation of the traditional Currency Demand Approach (CDA) à la Tanzi. We introduce three main innovations. First, we take as dependent variable in the money demand equation a direct measure of the value of cash transactions: the flow of cash withdrawn from current accounts relative to total non-cash payments. This avoids use of the Fisher equation and so overcomes two severe criticisms of the traditional CDA. Second, instead of the tax burden, usually taken as the main motive for non-compliance, we include among the covariates two direct indicators of detected tax evasion. Finally, we also control for the role of illegal economic activity, such as drug dealing and prostitution, whichjointly with the shadow economy -contributes to the larger aggregate of the unobserved economy and represents a significant component of total cash payments. We then propose an application of this "modified CDA" to a panel of 91 Italian provinces for the years 2005-2008.
Introduction 1
The Currency Demand Approach (CDA) is the most widely used of the so-called indirect macroeconomic approaches to estimating the underground or shadow economy. Originally suggested by Cagan (1958) , the CDA was subsequently refined and applied by Tanzi (1980 Tanzi ( , 1983 to the U.S. economy and has been commonly used in the literature (among the more recent contributions, see Ferwerda et al., 2010) . The CDA measures the size of the shadow economy in two stages: 1) the econometric estimation of an aggregate money demand equation, with a specific component related to cash transactions in the underground sector; 2) the computation of the value of these shadow transactions via the quantity theory of money.
The key assumptions for the first-stage estimation are that shadow transactions are settled in cash to avoid traceability, and that the main motive for underground economic activity is avoiding a high tax burden. The CDA involves estimating the aggregate demand for cash, including among the regressors both the standard explanatory variables of the preference for liquidity (such as the interest rate on deposits) and specific variables identifying the determinants of the shadow economy (such as the level of the tax burden). The demand for cash associated with shadow transactions is then computed as the difference between the estimated demand for cash in the full model and the demand obtained by setting to zero all the determinants of the underground economy (i.e. the demand for cash motivated only by regular transactions).
More precisely, in the Tanzi (1980 Tanzi ( , 1983 application of the CDA to the U.S. economy, the dependent variable in the money demand equation is the ratio of cash to money supply. This ratio is regressed on three variables identifying the determinants of money demand for regular transactions (the share of national income consisting in wages paid in cash, the interest rate on savings deposits, and per capita income), plus the average tax rate on personal income, posited as the sole determinant of shadow transactions. Since a basic assumption of the CDA is that a heavier tax burden prompts more tax evasion, increasing the 6 demand for cash, the expected sign on the income tax rate is positive. First-stage estimation of the money demand equation confirms this view. In the second stage, the estimate of the ratio of the underground economy to GDP is obtained by exploiting the Fisher equation. In particular, Tanzi defines a base year in which the contribution of the underground economy to GDP is assumed to be zero, and computes the velocity of money as the ratio of the official GDP to the stock of liquid assets. Assuming then that this velocity is the same for the regular economy and the shadow sector, the size of the shadow economy is obtained by multiplying V by the estimated "excess demand" for cash. Enste (2000, 2002) identify and discuss many substantial drawbacks of the CDA, pointing to three main criticisms of its basic assumptions 2 : i) no underground economy transactions in the base year; ii) equal velocity of money in the official and the irregular economy; iii) no determinant of the shadow economy except the excessive tax burden. Our aim here is to contribute to the debate on measuring the underground economy with a proposed revision of the CDA that overcomes all three drawbacks. Our "modified CDA" makes three main innovations: first, our dependent variable in the money demand equation is a direct measure of cash transactions (the flow of cash withdrawn from current bank and postal accounts relative to total non-cash payments), which obviates the need for the Fisher equation; second, rather than the level of the tax burden, we include among the covariates two direct measures of detected tax evasion, thus overcoming a serious problem of potential misspecification of the model due to the inability to consider all the relevant determinants; and third, we also control for the influence of illegal economic activity (such as drug dealing and prostitution), which together with the shadow economy contributes to the larger aggregate of the unobserved economy and represents a significant component of total cash payments (OECD, 2002) . We then propose an original application of this "modified CDA" to Italy, where the underground economy is considerably larger than in many other Western countries.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses our innovations to the CDA and shows how they overcome most of the drawbacks highlighted by Enste (2000, 2002) . Section 3 applies our "modified CDA" to Italy, discussing model specification and empirical results. Section 4 sets out some brief concluding remarks. 
Reinterpreting the Currency Demand Approach
We start from the criticisms advanced by Enste (2000, 2002) of most of the assumptions of the traditional CDA. We focus here on three debatable assumptions: (1) the absence of any transactions in the underground economy in the base year, which is unrealistic; (2) the equality in money velocity in the official and the irregular economy, which places a hardly justifiable restriction on the estimation method; and (3) an excessive tax burden as the sole determinant of the shadow economy, which is also quite restrictive, since other factors -such as market regulation (especially the regulation of labour markets), trust in political institutions, and the citizens' tax morale -can substantially affect the decision to engage in underground economic activity.
To address these criticisms, we make three innovations to the traditional CDA à la Tanzi.
First, instead of using the stock of liquid assets as the dependent variable in the money demand equation, we take a direct measure of cash transactions: the flow of cash withdrawn from current (bank and postal) accounts with respect to total payments settled by instruments other than cash. This is a substantial modification of the model, dispensing with the need for the quantity theory of money and the Fisher equation. In this way, we overcome the first weakness, i.e. the need for an arbitrary base year for calculating the velocity of money, and the second, namely the assumption of equal velocity of money in the official economy and the shadow sector. Notice that the cash withdrawal variable also helps to deal with the problematic measurement of the stock of liquid assets in each country following the introduction of the euro, which can severely limit the application of the traditional CDA.
Second, in order to reply to critique (3), direct measures of detected tax evasion are included among the factors positively correlated with the amount of (irregular) transactions settled in cash. In this way, we escape the need to identify a set of variables that can adequately capture all the relevant determinants of the shadow economy, apart from the tax burden which is the crucial variable in the classic Tanzi approach and excludes any other factors in noncompliance (e.g., Ferwerda et al., 2010; Schneider, 2010) . We look directly at the final outcome of this process -so as to circumvent the problem of incomplete specification of the model -and investigate the relationship between the number of detected cases of tax evasion and the use of cash in transactions. 8 Finally, with reference again to criticism (3) and the issue of model misspecification, we argue that shadow economy is only one component of the total amount of cash payments.
Indeed, according to the OECD (2002) classification, the activities that contribute most to the so-called unobserved (cash-settled) economy in developed countries include not only underground but also illegal production: the former is defined as "those activities that are productive and legal but are deliberately concealed from the public authorities to avoid payment of taxes or complying with regulations," while the latter mainly refers to "the production of goods and services whose production, sale or mere possession is forbidden by law". Hence, in order to avoid potential distortions in the estimation of the underground component of unobserved economy (as emphasized by Zizza, 2002) , the CDA methodology we propose also controls for the presence of illegal production. We consider, in particular, two criminal activities -drug dealing and prostitution -that represent illegal transactions typically settled in cash and that are universally considered as the most important activities within the illegal economy. 3 Notice that the choices of the individuals operating in the two sectors of the unobserved economy (underground and illegal) stem from different motivations and incentive mechanisms, including the role of deterrence. The two components also differ significantly in their effect on the public finances and their implications for law enforcement, since one can identify potentially recoverable revenues (through tax audits) only for the shadow economy, whereas in the case of illegal production the goal is to suppress the criminal activity outright through police work and imprisonment. Despite these significant differences, the literature rarely investigates the disaggregation of total unobserved economy into underground and illegal production, mainly because delineating the boundaries of the analysis is quite difficult and reliable information is lacking. 4 Here we exploit crime indicators related to drug dealing and prostitution to make a more precise estimate of the excess demand 9 for cash transactions due to tax evasion, by isolating the illegal component of the unobserved economy; this represents our third innovation with respect to the traditional CDA. 5 This will also provide additional insights with respect to the official figures provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) since unlike tax evasion illegal activities are not included in the national accounts estimates.
3. An application of the "modified CDA"
Defining the demand for cash payments
In this section of the paper we provide a first application of the "modified CDA" to a balanced panel of 91 Italian provinces observed from 2005 to 2008. We first need to discuss the definition of the demand for cash payments, then its determinants. As to demand, we depart from the standard CDA and exploit information on the flow of cash rather than the stock of liquid assets. Hence, we base our assessment of the size of the shadow economy on a direct measure of the value of transactions at provincial level. In particular, our dependent variable in the estimated equation of the demand for cash payments (CASH) is the ratio of the value of cash withdrawn from current accounts to the value of total payments settled by instruments other than cash. This represents a measure of the demand for untraced payments per euro of traceable payments (i.e., bank transfers, cheques, credit cards).
The transactions theory of money demand counts liquid assets as such (e.g., M1), not the concept of payment. The latter necessarily implies a cash flow and precise technical and organizational procedures by which the flow circulates. Even with reliable statistics, however, stock indicators can be highly inaccurate for three reasons: a) quantifying the level of national currency used outside national borders is problematic, and this is particularly true in the euro area since the cash changeover in 2002; b) a certain amount of money can be held for purposes other than transactions (traditional theories posit, for instance, the "speculative motive"); and c) the velocity of money is assumed to be constant with respect to several GDP components, including the informal sector, without taking into account such factors as trade in intermediate goods and services. Hence, there may be compensatory phenomena within the same stock of banknotes in circulation, both between different motives for holding cash reserves, and between the formal and the informal sector. This is confirmed by the recent trend in currency-to-GDP ratios in the G10 and Eurosystem countries: the ratio has remained stable or even risen since 2004 in the countries that should have been most affected by the replacement of banknotes with digital money. Similar considerations hold for other stockbased indicators of currency demand, such as M1 (currency and sight deposits). Notice that while an increase in a stock-based monetary aggregate is a signal of greater liquidity preference, it is not informative about the motives, which may include portfolio re balancing, the adjustment of liquidity buffers, the need to hide transactions (either for tax evasion or illegal activity). The European Central Bank has noted that, on the occasion of the cash changeover, the stock of euro banknotes in circulation increased (even compared to M1 or M2) more than the previous circulation of national currencies would have suggested (ECB, 2008) . According to the ECB, "this is reasonable, in particular, in an environment of low interest rates and low inflation expectations", not to mention that an estimate of up to 20 percent of the banknotes outstanding are outside the euro area. As a consequence, it is difficult if not impossible to estimate the component of cash held to settle payments within the underground economy from data on stocks. This is why researchers need to select monetary indicators more directly related to the transaction motive.
To clarify this issue, Figure 1 shows the divergence in recent trends of the currency-to-GDP and the currency-to-M1 ratios as compared to their respective flows in Italy: stocks rise while flows decline. The increasing trend of stocks is explained by the ECB clarification cited above. The decreasing trend of flows is consistent with the spread of electronic payment instruments in commercial transactions, which allow some substitution between alternative instruments in the formal economy. Furthermore, the common trend of the two flow-based indicators confirms the greater consistency of these indicators with the transaction motive for cash demand. The combined evidence of such a "substitution effect" of cash flows and the growing trend of the stock of banknotes suggests a slowdown in the overall velocity of circulation of legal money for liquidity needs that are not purely transactional. All these considerations lend force to the criticisms of the traditional CDA based on the quantity theory of money. 
Sources: Based on Bank of Italy and Istat data
The direct link between flow-based indicators of currency demand and the transaction motive for holding cash is also underscored by micro-data on cash purchases collected by the Bank of Italy in its Survey of Household Income and Wealth. Table 1 illustrates the correlation matrix of two different (macro) currency ratios (based on cash withdrawals divided by other payment transactions) and the percentage ratio of cash purchases to total expenditures declared by the survey sample households in the period 2006-2008 (nearly the same period considered in this study). The correlation coefficients are positive and significant in all cases. As one would expect, the "ATM cash withdrawals to POS card transactions" ratio shows a higher correlation with the "Cash expenditure share by Italian households" than does the ratio of "Total cash withdrawals value flows to total non-cash payments". In other words, the closer the monetary indicator is to the "point of sale", the stronger the 12 correlation with household cash expenditures. 6 Nevertheless, the broader indicator of cash use -"Total cash withdrawals value flows to total non-cash payments" -better accounts for the behaviour of all the economic agents (private firms and the public sector as well as households), which makes it more appropriate for our purposes. 
Defining the determinants of cash payments
In line with the discussion in Section 2, we classify the determinants of CASH into three groups, identifying three components of the demand for cash payments: structural, underground (or tax evasion), and illegal (or crime). A description of the variables affecting each of the three components is provided below. The Appendix reports descriptive statistics for all covariates and information on data sources (see Tables A1 and A2) .
The structural component of the demand for cash payments
Drawing on the literature (e.g., Goodhart and Krueger, 2001 ), we identify four conventional determinants of the structural demand for cash payments: the level of economicdevelopment, the degree of spatial diffusion of banking, the payment technology and the interest rate. Economic development is measured as per capita GDP at the provincial level (YPC). As several authors suggest (e.g., Schneider and Enste, 2000; Schneider, 2010) , the expected sign of this variable is negative: the higher the standard of living, the lower the relative use of cash and the greater the demand for alternative payment instruments. Income is closely correlated with education (both general education and "financial literacy"), and more education usually leads to less use of cash, since more educated individuals have greater trust in alternative payment instruments (World Bank, 2005; Ferwerda et al., 2010) .
We use the per capita number of current accounts (BANK) as a proxy for the diffusion of banking, thus controlling for the structural impact of the degree of bank branch diffusion on the demand for cash payments. The expected sign of the BANK coefficient is negative, in that where there are more current accounts there is less need to withdraw cash from ATMs to make payments.
A number of studies (e.g., Drehmann and Goodhart, 2000; Goodhart and Krueger, 2001; Schneider, 2009) emphasize the importance of the payment technology, with special reference to electronic payment instruments. In our model, the structural determinants of CASH include the variable ELECTRO, the value of transactions settled by electronic payments in proportion to provincial GDP. Since a higher share of electronic transactions (via POS and internet banking) implies fewer cash transactions, the expected sign of ELECTRO is negative.
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The interest rate on current deposits (INT) is the fourth determinant of the structural component of CASH. Based on standard economic theory, it is expected to have a negative effect on the demand for money, insofar as a higher interest rate increases the opportunity cost of holding cash instead of interest-bearing assets. However, our model deals with cash flows rather than stocks of liquid assets, which implies an ambiguous effect of the interest rate. 7 Higher interest rates might even have a positive impact on flows, for instance, by fostering the raising of cash outside the banking channel. However, given the standard "speculative" motive, we cannot exclude the possibility that a higher interest rate on bank deposits may also diminish the propensity to withdraw cash as an alternative to other payment instruments. Thus, the expected sign of the INT coefficient is ambiguous.
The underground component
We revise the traditional CDA by using measures of detected tax evasion in lieu of the standard proxies for the tax burden, such as the average income tax rate. Data on detected tax evasion are retrieved from a dataset on law enforcement inspections carried out by the
Italian finance police (Guardia di Finanza). This information is particularly relevant for two
reasons. First, many factors in addition to the tax and social security burden are likely to influence the decision to evade the surveillance of the tax authorities (market regulation, citizens' tax morale, the efficiency of government, etc.), and each of these factors would need its own proxy. 8 Second, there are no available data on the actual tax rate at the provincial level in Italy, and the calculation of some measures of the tax burden at that level is not simple, since taxes are levied by different levels of government.
To overcome these problems, we selected two variables that provide a direct measure of the diffusion of the economic activities not fully known to the tax authorities at the provincial level. EVAS1 is the number of targeted tax audits 9 in a given province divided by its sample mean (this is a measure of tax evasion intensity at the provincial level) and then 7 Studies on the role of innovative payment systems in the cash demand of Italian households (e.g., Ardizzi and Tresoldi, 2003; Lippi and Secchi, 2008; Alvarez and Lippi, 2009) have found that progress in transaction technology can actually reduce (or even eliminate) the impact of the interest rate on buyers' demand for cash. 8 For a discussion of these other determinants of the decision to operate in the shadow economy see, among others, Friedman et al. (2000) , Enste (2000, 2002) , Feld and Frey (2007) , Dreher et al. (2009) , Torgler and Schneider (2009) , and Dreher and Schneider (2010) . 9 These audits are targeted in the sense that they imply inspections of firms based on information of fraud within a particular operation (e.g., payment of salaries) and/or related to a single item of the tax base (e.g., income taxes or social security contributions).
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weighted by a GDP concentration index. 10 This latter standardization allows us to compare provinces characterized by large differences in level of economic development, and so to avoid automatically attaching higher levels of tax evasion to provinces with an above-average number of audits. The second variable (EVAS2) takes account of irregularities detected by the finance police in inspections of retailers. It is modeled as the ratio of the number of positive audits on cash registers and tax receipts to the number of existing POS terminals in the province. 11 The standardization for the number of POS terminals is necessary because of the very great inter-provincial variability in their number, which is likely to affect the opportunity for evasion (which will be lower where the number of terminals is higher). Both EVAS1 and EVAS2 are included in our model, in that the former refers to inspections that may relate to any assumed fiscal irregularity (evasion of income and indirect taxes or social security contributions) in any type of business, whereas the latter certainly detects only tax frauds in sales by retailers (VAT and income tax evasion). Thus, EVAS1 and EVAS2 are expected to jointly provide a more comprehensive evaluation of the underground component of the demand for cash payments.
The illegal component
A further innovation with respect to the standard CDA is an index of the crime rate, in order to separate the illegal component of unobserved (cash-settled) economy from shadow economic activity. 12 Our CRIME indicator is defined as the ratio of drug and prostitution offenses to the total number of crimes reported in the province. Like the tax evasion variables, this indicator has been weighted by a GDP concentration index. The selection of the variables used to estimate the size of the illegal economy needs a brief explanation. Our choice of drug-and prostitution-related offenses is motivated by the focus on criminal activities that -in line with the OECD (2002) definition of the illegal economy -imply an exchange between a seller and a buyer relying on a mutual agreement and a voluntary cash payment. Accordingly we excluded crimes that depend on violence (burglary, extortion, etc.) 10 The GDP concentration index is defined as the ratio of provincial GDP to its sample mean. 11 Here "positive" means audits that detected some evasion. The ratio is weighted for the GDP concentration index, for the same reasons discussed above.
12 To the best of our knowledge, the only previous attempt to account for the presence of criminal activities in Italy is Zizza (2002) , where the indicator is the share of thefts and robberies in the total number of reported crimes. However, as we argue below, this indicator is not adequate to capture the excess demand for cash payments due to illegal activity.
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and therefore imply payments that do not follow an agreement (as between thief and victim. 13 We also excluded those offences with possible ambiguous effects on the volume of cash withdrawals. This is the case of thefts, for instance, which might diminish our CASH variable because in areas where robbery is more common people may find it too dangerous to hold cash. In essence, our choice is consistent with the model to be estimated, which exploits information on cash withdrawals from current accounts due to a voluntary transactional motive.
Estimating the demand for cash payments
Equation [1] provides the complete model of the demand for cash payments to be estimated, which comprises the structural demand reflecting the ordinary preference for liquidity augmented by the components relating to the underground economy and illegal economic activity: Given the panel structure of the database, we use a random-effects Tobit model to account for unobservable residual heterogeneity across provinces (Wooldridge, 2002) . Unlike the standard panel regression with individual random effects, this model can accommodate the particular distribution of the dependent variable, which is censored and has a concentrated mass of positive values very close to zero. 14 In particular, we specify the error 13 We do not consider money laundering, since this is a crime that follows from other predicate offenses and amplifies the impact of organized crime on both the regular and the irregular economies in a cumulative way. The definition of the crime implies that the proceeds of the predicate crime must be "laundered" through some legal channel (e.g., bank transactions) in order to lower the chances of the criminal's being caught. After this, the "laundered" funds can be reinvested in legitimate activities. 14 The sample mean of CASH is 0.11 (median = 0.10), with a minimum of 0.01 and a maximum of 0.24; 75% of the observations show values below 0.14. Before considering the censored nature of CASH and adopting the Tobit specification, we estimated our model by both LSDV and GLS panel tecniques. The Hausman test did not reject the GLS model. Indeed, Cameron and Trivedi (2005) argue that one of the weaknesses of the LSDV model is the high degree of inaccuracy of the estimates when the within-panel variability is dominated by between-panel structure of Equation [1] as εit = ui + e it, where u denotes individual effects and e the standard disturbance term. 15 After obtaining the parameter estimates of the model, we adapt and apply the procedure originally proposed by Tanzi (1983) to gauge the size of the underground economy. The size of total (shadow plus illegal) unobserved transactions is given by the "excess demand" for cash payments -the portion not explained by structural factors. This excess demand is obtained as the difference between the fitted values of CASH from the full model [1] , and the predicted values from a restricted version of Equation [1] setting EVAS1 = EVAS2 = CRIME = 0. To evaluate the size of the two components of the unobserved economy separately, we then proceed in a similar manner, alternately imposing the restrictions EVAS1 = EVAS2 = 0 and CRIME = 0, and calculating the excess demand for cash payments due to tax evasion (underground economy) and criminal activities (illegal economy), respectively. Given our definition of CASH, the estimates so obtained are expressed in relation to total payments settled by instruments other than cash. To get measures that are comparable with previous studies, we then rescale our estimates of the shadow and illegal economy and express the results in terms of provincial GDP.
variability. Looking at Table A2 in the Appendix, it is clear that this is the case for all variables of our model (except INT). In light of this, we decided to adopt a random-effects Tobit specification. 15 We also tested a model including time effects in addition to provincial individual effects. However, apart from the year 2007, for which the estimated coefficient was negative and significant, no other time effect was statistically significant; and the estimates of the other coefficients in equation [1] and the assessment of both the dynamics and the geographical variations of the underground economy were practically unaffected. b Standard errors in parentheses; *** statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. Table 2 the presence of illegal activity in assessing the extent of the underground economy: the inclusion of CRIME significantly improves the model's fit ( 2 (1) = 9.76, p-value = 0.002) and also reduces the magnitude of the coefficient associated to EVAS2 from 0.027 to 0.010, thus lowering the total impact of tax evasion on the demand for cash and, possibly, the estimated size of the shadow economy. 16 Finally, for both specifications the coefficient ρ -which measures the proportion of total residual variance explained by individual effects (u) in relation to the proportion explained by noise (e) -is close to 0.80, underscoring the importance of using panel techniques to control for unobserved heterogeneity due to province-specific idiosyncratic random shocks.
Assessing the unobserved economy
The size of the total unobserved economy for each province in each year has been estimated by the most comprehensive specification of Equation [1] (MODEL B), which allows us to obtain separate measures for the underground and the illegal economy. Before computing average values (reported in Table 3 ), we discarded 26 outliers identified using the Hadi (1992 Hadi ( , 1994 method. a 26 outliers were dropped using the Hadi (1992 Hadi ( , 1994 method.
Several interesting results emerge from Table 3 . First, the estimated size of the unobserved economy due to tax evasion (16.5% of GDP over the entire period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] is 16 Results are robust to an alternative crime indicator defined as the ratio of drug and prostitution offences in a province divided by its sample mean value (weighted by a GDP concentration index).
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very close to the official figures provided by Istat (2010) , while Enste (2000, 2002) report much higher values (above 25% from the mid-1990s to 2000). As suggested by Zizza (2002) , this discrepancy is likely to reflect the role of criminal activities. Indeed, the ratio of the illegal economy's "value added" to GDP in 2007 is in line with the only available estimates provided by Eurispes (2008) 
Conclusions
This paper takes its place in the debate on the size of the underground economy with a reinterpretation of the standard currency demand approach à la Tanzi, which aims at overcoming the drawbacks criticized by Enste (2000, 2002) . Our contributions can be summarized as follows. First, we introduce a direct measure of the value of cash transactions as the dependent variable in the money demand equation. In particular, instead of the traditional money stock variable we use the flow of cash withdrawn from current accounts as a ratio to total non-cash payments. This innovation enables us to dispense with the Fisher equation and its unrealistic assumptions of zero underground production in the base year and equal velocity of money in the official and the irregular economy. Second, instead of taking tax burden as the key determinant of the decision to operate in the underground economy, we capture the "excess demand" for cash payments due to tax evasion by exploiting direct information on detected non-compliance, thus overcoming the problem of finding suitable proxies for all the relevant causes. Third, we also control for the role of illegal economic activity (in our case, drug dealing and prostitution), which -jointly with the shadow economy -contributes to the larger aggregate of the unobserved economy and accounts for a significant portion of total cash payments.
We apply this "modified CDA" to original data on monetary variables, tax evasion and reported illegal activities for the Italian provinces over the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Our results estimate the shadow economy at an average of 16.5% of GDP, which is consistent with the recent estimates available from official statistical sources relying on microeconomic methods but lower than the values for Italy in the international literature (e.g. Schneider and Enste, 2000 . We show that this discrepancy is likely to be due to the omission of illegal activities in the application of the standard CDA. This indicates that if one ignores illegal economic activity one may not only mistakenly attribute to the shadow economy a part of the cash payments due to criminal transactions but also underestimate the total incidence of the unobserved economy (namely underground plus illegal economic activity). It is worth noticing that the upward revision in the estimated size of the 22 unobserved economy, as we include illegal activities, does not mechanically translate in the final estimate of GDP. Indeed the latter results from an extensive and balanced process combining different inputs coming from both the demand and the supply side of the economy, with our estimate of illegal activity potentially providing a further ingredient. 
Appendix. The data

INT
Rate of interest on current deposits BI
Tax evasion EVAS1
Number of targeted tax audits in a province divided by its sample mean value (weighted by a GDP concentration index)
GdF and Eurostat
EVAS2
Ratio of the number of positive audits on cash registers and tax receipts to the number of POS terminals in the province (weighted by a GDP concentration index)
GdF and Eurostat
Criminal economy CRIME Share of crimes violating laws on drugs and prostitution in total reported crimes (weighted by a GDP concentration index) Istat and Eurostat 26 
